Saturday, November 14, 2026

 Spying and Stuff


I’m sure you are reading about the Jensen Huang affair. This story is, of course, about a lot more than spying. But if the sole consequences of Hunag’s story were the theft of secrets, I am not so worried. My view is that attempts to keep secrets are an ultimately futile pursuit. I am an advocate of radical transparency. No secrets. Many don’t agree with me.


If the US wants to compete with China and any other nation to advance AI, it will have to rely upon innovation. The way to keep ahead is not to attempt to block progress by others but to advance the technology more rapidly than they do.


I wrote a little piece a while ago about competition with China, if you're interested.


But the Huang story remindes me of events that took place in the 1980s while I was working in the Soviet Union… and convinces me of the ultimate futility of all clandestine espionage.


My IBM Trade Development group located in Paris did business with the Soviet Union, and we shipped computing and office equipment that was manufactured in Europe. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow used IBM equipment, such as Selectric typewriters. It purchased that equipment directly from IBM in the US through the State Department in Washington, and it was manufactured in and shipped directly from the US to an intermediary before arriving at Soviet customs. 


The Soviet compromise of IBM Selectric typewriters at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Leningrad consulate was uncovered through Project GUNMAN, an NSA intelligence operation carried out between 1976 and 1984.


I was traveling back and forth to the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1983. My group had nothing to do at all with this affair. I say this not to distance us from responsibility. Even if the equipment had been from us, I doubt we would have discovered the operation. But we were, in fact, unaware.


Key Details of the Operation


• Operation Name: Project GUNMAN (run by the U.S. National Security Agency).

• Timeline: Active for roughly 8 years (1976–1984) before being discovered and investigated.

• Scale: At least 16 bugged IBM Selectric II and III typewriters were identified across the Moscow embassy and the Leningrad consulate.

• Supply Chain Interception: The KGB intercepted the typewriters before they reached the embassy, modifying them with microscopic surveillance components during transit.


How the Bug Worked (Mechanics)


• Keylogging Sensors: The Soviets replaced standard structural metal support bars inside the typewriters with hollow aluminum bars containing tiny circuit boards and magnetometers.

• Tracking Movement: The magnetometers tracked the movement of the magnetized interposers and the rotating type ball to convert physical keystrokes into digital signals.

• Power Source: The implants drew power either from DC batteries or via AC mains connections using modified bleeding units.

• Wireless Transmissions: The converted keystroke data was stored and broadcast via low-power radio frequency burst transmissions in the 30, 60, or 90 MHz TV bands, utilizing modified internal mechanical linkages or springs/screws as antennas.

• Collection: Soviet agents parked vehicles near the embassy every few weeks to trigger and record the short, encrypted radio bursts, masking the signals amid local television frequencies.


Discovery and Aftermath


• Detection: Following a tip from an ally, the NSA launched Project GUNMAN, airlifting roughly 10 tons of embassy machinery back to the U.S. for X-ray and forensic inspection at Fort Meade.

• Generations of Bugs: Forensic analysis revealed five distinct evolutionary generations of the hardware implants.

• Security Reform: The breach forced a total overhaul of U.S. diplomatic security, strict import and supply-chain protocols, and specialized inspection facilities for all overseas plaintext processing hardware. You can read more about the historical analysis on the NSA GUNMAN Report and Bruce Schneier's write-up on Soviet Spying on US Selectric Typewriters.


An irony…the Soviets implanted antennas in the embassy walls to receive the broadcast data captured from the typewriters, but the embassy had constructed a safe room from which they conducted communications of sensitive material…not all, but most.


Moreover, the signals from the typewriters were very noisy, and the interpretability of the collected data was compromised, so it is uncertain whether anything useful was ever collected from this episode.


At the same time, a new US Embassy building was being constructed in Moscow. This incident caused a complete review of the new building, and it was discovered that the Soviets had bugged the entire structure.

The construction of the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow became one of the most notorious espionage scandals of the Cold War, known informally as "The Great Transmitter". Construction was halted in 1985 after U.S. inspectors discovered that Soviet intelligence had embedded thousands of sophisticated listening devices directly into the building's structural concrete and steel. 

The 1972 Construction Deal

  • Reciprocal Agreements. In 1969 and 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed agreements to build new embassies in each other's capitals. 

  • Soviet Prefabrication. Against the warnings of U.S. security officials, the agreement allowed Soviet workers to prefabricate the structural components off-site and assemble the eight-story brick building in Moscow. 

Discovery of the Espionage Network

  • Structural Bugging. During construction, which began in 1979, KGB engineers turned the building's steel beams, concrete columns, and bricks into a giant antenna network. The devices were designed to capture both spoken conversations and electronic emanations from typewriters and computers. 

  • The 1985 Halt. U.S. security teams used X-ray equipment to uncover the bugs, prompting Soviet workers to walk off the job. In August 1985, with the building roughly 65% complete, the U.S. government permanently halted construction. 

Decades of Debate and Reconstruction

  • Standing Empty. For over a decade, the empty eight-story shell sat unused in downtown Moscow. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan recommended tearing the building down completely.

  • The Compromise Solution. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Russia signed a new construction agreement in 1992. Rather than demolishing the entire structure, Congress approved a $240 million plan to renovate it using only American workers and U.S.-sourced materials.

  • Top-Down Rebuild. American crews stripped off the top two floors and the brick exterior, replacing them with four brand-new, secure floors wrapped in white marble and glass. The lower six floors—presumed to still contain unremovable bugs—were restricted strictly to unclassified work, while sensitive diplomatic operations moved to the newly built top levels. 

The renovated ten-story structure, officially named the New Office Building (NOB), finally opened in May 2000—more than 20 years after ground was first broken. During the same Cold War era, the United States launched Operation Monopoly, a top-secret FBI and NSA project to dig an eavesdropping tunnel directly beneath the new Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Despite costing several hundred million dollars over more than a decade, the operation failed to produce useful intelligence and was ultimately betrayed by an FBI mole. 

The Mount Alto Advantage

  • High-Ground Concerns. Under the same reciprocal agreements that allowed the U.S. to build in Moscow, the Soviet Union leased land on Mount Alto—one of the highest elevations in Washington, D.C. 

  • Signal Interception. U.S. intelligence officials worried that the elevated compound gave the Soviets a direct line of sight to intercept microwave communications from the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the CIA. 

Digging Operation Monopoly

  • The Cover House. Starting in 1977, the FBI purchased a townhouse across the street from the new Soviet compound on Wisconsin Avenue. 

  • Underground Construction. From the basement of that home, intelligence engineers excavated a tunnel beneath the street to reach directly under the Soviet complex. The goal was to tap into telecommunications cables and deploy advanced NSA listening gear to capture conversations inside. 

  • Engineering Nightmares. The project was plagued by technical setbacks from the start. The tunnel suffered from constant water leaks, encountered pockets of hazardous gas, and struggled with failing surveillance equipment. 

Soviet Countermeasures and Betrayal

  • Strict Security. Having planted bugs in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets suspected Washington would try the same. They inspected building materials, disassembled windows before installation, and bored deep perimeter holes around their compound to detect underground activity.

  • The Robert Hanssen Leak. Whatever slim chance the tunnel had was destroyed from within. FBI counterintelligence agent Robert Hanssen—who began spying for Moscow in 1985—sold the secret of Operation Monopoly to the KGB.

  • Public Exposure. Because the Soviets knew the tunnel existed, they simply avoided discussing sensitive matters in targeted areas or used the channel to feed disinformation. The tunnel remained a closely guarded secret until Hanssen's arrest in February 2001, after which the FBI permanently sealed the entrance.

At the same time, again unbeknownst to me, the CIA station in Moscow was undertaking one of the most potentially important clandestine activities of the Cold War.

The Core Subject and Breakthrough

  • The Asset: Adolf Tolkachev worked as a lead engineer at a top-secret Soviet military research institute (NIIR), designing advanced radar and avionics for fighter jets. 

  • The Approach: For years, the CIA struggled to run operations inside Moscow under the heavy, omnipresent surveillance of the KGB. In 1978, Tolkachev initiated contact by slipping an envelope of top-secret documents to the CIA Moscow station chief (initially rebuffed or viewed with suspicion before the agency realized his legitimacy). 

  • The Intelligence: From 1979 to 1985, Tolkachev handed over tens of thousands of pages of blueprints, circuit diagrams, and military R&D secrets using miniature Pentax cameras and film supplied by his handlers. 

    • The Value: His intelligence gave the U.S. deep insight into Soviet fighter capabilities and saved the Pentagon an estimated $2 billion in research and counter-measure development—earning him the moniker "the billion-dollar spy".

Clandestine Tradecraft and Moscow Realities

  • High-Risk Operations: Unlike typical Hollywood spy tropes, Hoffman details the gritty, tedious, and nerve-wracking reality of running assets in the KGB's home territory.

  • Dead Drops and Brush Contacts: Tolkachev and his CIA case officers communicated via hidden codes, street-corner signals, brief encounters in public parks, and concealed signal devices to evade constant physical and technical surveillance. 

  • Bureaucratic Friction: The book highlights the tension between bold field officers in Moscow and a cautious, risk-averse CIA leadership back in Langley, Virginia. 

Motivation and Tragic Downfall

  • Why He Spied: Driven not by money alone, Tolkachev harbored a deep-seated hatred for the Soviet regime due to the state-sponsored purges and suffering experienced by his wife's family. 

  • The Betrayal: Tolkachev's remarkable run ended in 1985. He was compromised and betrayed to the KGB—most infamously linked to disclosures by a disgruntled and compromised former CIA trainee/officer, Edward Lee Howard (among other security breakdowns during the disastrous "Year of the Spy" in 1985). 

  • The Outcome: Tolkachev was arrested, interrogated, tried, and subsequently executed by the Soviet state. 


Again, with great irony, the information collected by the CIA from Tolkachev had limited value because the US agency...the US Air Force… which could have benefited by knowing the details of Soviet radar technology…did not trust the information. The Air Force had great concerns about authenticity. It thought that perhaps it had been ‘planted.’


Doesn’t all this lend at least some credibility to a claim that clandestine espionage is so accompanied by such keystone cops mix-ups and hampered by human frailties that it is not worth the time or money or energy or compromise of principles.


A footnote: Burton Gerber,
the CIA station chief during the Billion Dollar Spy episode, was a member of the China Club in Washington, my little excuse once a month to get together with 12 other men to have dinner at a good Chinese restaurant in Washington and talk politics. Katherine supported the China Club, but she lobbied to have women included not on the basis of equality but because it would improve the discussion.


The China Club was organized by a good family friend, Marvin 

Weissberg. Katherine and I were introduced to Marvin by Judith Morris. She and Marvin were companions. Michael Higgins introduced us to Judith. 


Michael, Gene Kilby, and I were old friends. We spent more time than I can now justify, but still recall in detail, such as the Arnold Palmers we would consume thirstily after a round, on the now infamous golf course, Haines Point, in Washington, that Trump is now attempting to destroy.


It's all connected. Katherine and Judith trained for months by walking the streets of Georgetown with packs on their backs and hiking shoes on their feet in preparation for the first of Katherine’s 5 trips to the Camino in Spain.


And last, the Billion Dollar Spy book is being made into a movie with Russell Crowe as Tolkachev.



  Spying and Stuff I’m sure you are reading about the Jensen Huang affair. This story is, of course, about a lot more than spying. But if th...